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ABSTRACT
The main aim of this paper is to present an interpretation of what Socrates understood by being 
good for a human being. Starting from the evidence in the Symposium that Socrates himself was 
a phronimos and sophron person, I seek to show how Socratic ethics is centered on the thesis 
of the (1) identity of virtue and knowledge, which I articulate with the theme of (2) Socratic ig-
norance, and (3) the role of Socrates as an educator, to display how Socrates attempted to help 
people to improve themselves. In order to explore the core of Socratic moral thought, I take into 
account Penner’s explanation of Socratic intellectualism endorsing his description of what being 
good for a person means, but not following his conclusions. Then I argue that even if Socrates 
had held moral beliefs and been to a certain degree wise and virtuous, the moral knowledge, 
virtue, wisdom or the science of the good that only the gods completely master should not be 
ascribed to him. Socrates often made profession of ignorance. In the Apology, the knowledge 
that he admits to having and that makes him wiser than the others is “human wisdom”, that is, 
the recognition of his own ignorance and, in general, human ignorance about how to live well. 
Endowed with this self-knowledge, Socrates assumed the educational task to try to free people 
from the worst ignorance: not to know and to think that you know. Through philosophy practiced 
as examination by refutation (elenchos), he did his best to lead his fellows to self-knowledge, to 
take care of their souls, to dedicate themselves to phronesis, truth, and perfection of soul, in sum, 
to be prudent; this is the only way in which a person would do well, be good and happy.
Keywords: Socrates, virtue, knowledge, being good. 
RESUMO
O principal objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma interpretação do que Sócrates entendia 
por ser bom para um ser humano. Partindo da evidência no Banquete de que o próprio Só-
crates era um indivíduo phronimos e sophron, procuro mostrar como a ética socrática está 
centrada na tese da (1) identidade da virtude com o conhecimento, que articulo com o tema 
da (2) ignorância socrática e (3) o papel de Sócrates como educador para mostrar como 
Sócrates tentou ajudar as pessoas a melhorarem a si mesmas. Para explorar o núcleo do pen-
samento moral socrático, levo em consideração a explicação de Penner do intelectualismo 
socrático, endossando sua descrição do que significa ser bom para uma pessoa, mas não 
seguindo suas conclusões. Argumento então que, mesmo que Sócrates tenha sustentado 
crenças morais e, em certo grau, tenha sido sábio e virtuoso, não se deveria atribuir a ele 
o conhecimento moral, a virtude, a sabedoria ou a ciência do bem que somente os deuses 
dominam completamente. Sócrates costumava fazer profissão de ignorância. Na Apologia, 
o conhecimento que ele admite ter e que o torna mais sábio que os outros é a “sabedoria 
humana”, isto é, o reconhecimento de sua própria ignorância e, em geral, da ignorância hu-
mana sobre como viver bem. Municiado deste autoconhecimento, Sócrates assumiu a tarefa 
educacional de tentar libertar as pessoas da pior ignorância: não saber e pensar que sabem. 
Por meio da filosofia praticada como exame através da refutação (elenchos), ele se esforçou 
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Introduction
Alcibiades’ sp eech, in Plato’s Symposium, indicates that 
Socrates3 was no ignorant inquirer, but a person endowed 
with soundness of mind (sophrosune) (216d), prudence
(phronesis), courage (andreia), and strength (karteria) (219d), 
moral qualities and virtues that he – in so far as he possessed 
them – acquired or developed by constantly examining him-
self and others. The emphasis put on sophrosune and phrone-
sis4 suggests that Socrates’ conception of a virtuous and good 
life was centered on the idea that only knowledge can make 
us better. In order to make sense of what Socrates means by 
being good as a human being, I will address the theme of (1) 
the identity between virtue and knowledge, which I seek to 
articulate with the theme of  (2) Socratic ignorance, and (3) 
the role of Socrates as an educator, to show that, since the 
good life is based on the knowledge which is virtue, although 
neither Socrates nor anyone else master the science that se-
cures happiness, he was a good human being to the extent that 
he pursued virtue and was a prudent and thoughtful person, 
teaching others to do the same; so someone can be good by 
being prudent, act ing with phronesis and sophrosune. 
1. Virtue is knowledge
In Socratic scholarship it is almost consensually admitted 
that Socrates claims that virtue is knowledge. Indeed, in Plato’s 
early dialogues, this claim is conveyed5 by Socrates’ insistence on 
the idea that a successful life results from wisdom, that is, wisdom 
is the only real means to happiness. There is plenty of textual ev-
idence for this6; the Euthydemus is a case in point.
At Euthydemus 278e-282d, Socrates develops a protreptic 
discourse designed to encourage Cleinias to “devote himself to 
wisdom (sophia) and virtue (arete)”. He reaches some contro-
versial views about the relation between wisdom and happiness 
starting out from claims about happiness or doing well7 that 
are widely accepted. It seems too obvious that all of us wish to 
do well and be happy; it seems equally obvious that we achieve 
happiness through having lots of good things, namely, wealth, 
good looks, health, good birth, power, and public honors. Also, 
the ethical virtues: temperance, justice, courage, wisdom (so-
phia), and lastly good fortune (euthuchia). Intriguingly, how-
ever, Socrates warns that good fortune was perhaps repeated 
unnecessarily, since euthuchia turns out to be nothing else than 
sophia. For “wisdom makes men fortunate in every case […] 
with wisdom one could not ever make any sort of mistake, but 
must necessarily do right and be lucky”8 (280a). Based on this, 
Socrates argues that none of the other mentioned goods en-
sures happiness except wisdom, because not mere use but right 
use, which is determined by knowledge (episteme, 281b1), is 
needed to make one happy. Only prudence and wisdom (phro-
nesis kai sophia, 281b6; d8) endow our possession or act ion with 
advantage. Accordingly, things popularly considered good are, 
for Socrates, in themselves deprived of value; they are neither 
good nor bad, but they will be good if controlled by wisdom 
and bad if controlled by ignorance; so, “of these two, wisdom is 
good and ignorance bad” (281e). As a result, if people wish to 
be happy, they should by all means attempt “to become as wise 
as possible” (282a).
ao máximo para levar seus companheiros ao autoconhecimento, a cuidarem de suas almas, 
dedicarem-se à phronesis, à verdade e à perfeição de alma, em suma, a serem prudentes; 
esta é a única maneira pela qual uma pessoa atuaria bem, seria boa e feliz.
Palavras-chave: Sócrates, virtude, conhecimento, ser bom.
3 I shall not be concerned here with reconstructing the historical Socrates; rather, throughout this paper Socrates should be taken as the 
character of Plato’s dialogues.
4 Plato used the two nouns synonymously. The sense of sophrosune is well presented by Cooper (1997, p. 639): “Sophrosune means a 
well-developed consciousness of oneself and one’s legitimate duties in relation to others […] and in relation to one’s own ambitions, 
social standing, and the relevant expectations as regards one’s own behavior”
5 Rowe (2011, p. 206) is right in remarking that “‘Virtue’, or ‘excellence’ (or ‘goodness’: aretê) is knowledge […] is the theme around 
which the Socrates of a whole series of dialogues dances, without ever firmly asserting it; but then how could he assert it, when he knows 
nothing?” The question is complex. In fact, in Plato’s early dialogues Socrates often appears dealing with a virtue in particular – e. g. 
courage, soundness of mind, justice – or all together as knowledge without explicit arguments to identify virtue with knowledge. The 
Meno is an exception. In this book, Socrates formulates an argument that concludes with the statement that virtue, as it is beneficial, 
must be a kind of wisdom (phronesis, 88d3, 89a). Some pages later, however, virtue is said not to be knowledge, since it is shown not to 
be teachable. In any event, the general frame found in the dialogues to identify virtue with knowledge is the following: 1- The only thing 
which always benefits us is wisdom. 2- Virtue always benefits us. 3- Therefore virtue is wisdom (Reshotko, 2006, p. 95)..
6 Protagoras, 360e-361c; Laches, 199d-e; Gorgias, 506d-507c; Republic I 350d-351c, inter alia.
7 “Doing well” (eu prattein) and “happiness” (eudaimonia) are clearly synonymous in this passage and refer to a successful way to live. 
For the same idea, Socrates also used the expression “living well” (eu zen).
8 I quote from the translation by Sprague.
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I do not discuss here whether virtue contributes to happi-
ness as an instrument or as an ingredient, however I sympathize 
with a moderate version of the instrumentalist view: virtue is 
surely the best means to attain happiness, but as the art of living 
it is not limited to a sp ecific realm of human act ion; as it encom-
passes life as a whole, virtue should be inseparable from living 
well. Also, I do not address the question whether it is sufficient 
or only necessary for good life, but I stress that when Socra-
tes asserts that only virtue or wisdom can lead to happiness, he 
does not necessarily mean that it alone makes it. It seems clear 
that, for Socrates, even if wisdom is the only thing good in itself, 
it is still good for the sake of a final good9, eudaimonia, the ut-
most end of all our act ions. As is well known, Socrates held the 
two following tenets concerning human psychological motiva-
tion for act ion: each person desires the good, that is happiness; 
and, in pursuing it, no one errs willingly. Under the influence of 
these ideas, Socrates advanced the identity between virtue and 
knowledge – the core of his ethical doctrine. This identity is 
implied by the argument that there is no good fortune without 
wisdom. Through an inductive argument, Socrates intended to 
show that smart craftsmen are much more successful in their 
areas of expertise than ignorant craftsmen; this for the obvious 
reason that the former have while the latter lack knowledge10. 
Therefore, if people have knowledge, they do not need luck. 
Notice, however, that Socrates’ suggestion is not to eliminate 
good fortune as conducive to happiness; he simply claims that 
“the person with wisdom or knowledge will invariably make 
decisions or choices conducive to his or her happiness” (Benson, 
2000, p. 150). Good fortune, in the sense of success, was just 
reduced to wisdom11. Therefore, without knowledge nobody 
can be good. That is why virtue is knowledge.
Concerning the intrinsic relation between virtue and good 
life in the moral philosophy of Socrates, it is worth taking into 
account Terry Penner’s interpretation of Socratic intellectual-
ism. Firstly, Penner explains the Socratic psychology of act ion 
through the belief/desire theory according to which every delib-
erate act ion is determined by the interact ion of “the generalized 
desire” for good/happiness with “a belief about which particular 
act ion will best produce this good” (Penner, 2011, p. 268)12. Also, 
to clarify Socratic ethics, Penner introduces the distinction be-
tween the human good and human good-ness: virtue is human 
goodness, whereas happiness is the human good; and then re-
sorts to the theory of functional good according to which what-
ever does any work (for instance, artifacts, sensory organs, athlet-
ic act ivities, sciences) has a corresponding function: the good or 
end it achieves, and virtue, that means, the power of “providing 
the means to success in gaining that end”. For example, medicine 
has health as its good and end, and a good doctor has “the virtue 
of medical pract itioners through his or her goodness at contriv-
ing the means leading to that end”. So too “the science of ethics 
(the science of happiness) has its end, or good, namely human 
happiness, and a human being has the virtue of a human being, 
or is a good human being through being good at contriving the 
means leading to that happiness” (Kim, 2012). By enabling us to 
improve our beliefs about the best course of act ion, the science of 
human good makes us do well. Hence, a good or virtuous person 
is he or she who is good at gaining happiness just by having the 
“appropriate (true) belief-structure about what will lead to the 
best achievable outcome here and now” (Penner, 2011, p. 269). 
This wisdom, says Penner, is “a science like any other” with purely 
factual ends13, and so it leaves no room for any moral principles, 
norms or intrinsic goods. 
9 Penner (2011, p. 271) makes it clear: “When Socrates says that virtue [= wisdom] is the only thing good in itself, the context is a discussion 
of means to happiness (Euthydemus 279A1–4 with 278E3–6 and 282A1–7). So what Socrates is saying here, in this context of choice between 
rival candidates for being the best means to happiness, and in singling out wisdom as the only thing ‘good in itself,’ is not that wisdom is the 
only thing good in itself simpliciter – much as that will appeal to those anxious to find the intrinsic good or the moral good in Socrates – but 
that wisdom is the only thing good in itself as a means to happiness. He is presupposing that happiness is the final end, and so the good. 
Accordingly, when he says that wisdom is the one thing good in itself, he can only be saying that it is the one thing good in itself as a means”.
10 It was a Socratic saying, according to Nicias, that “every man is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is ignorant 
(Laches, 194c-d).
11 For a careful and enlightening analysis of the argument for the identity between good luck and wisdom, see Rudebusch (2009, p. 122-127).
12 Also, Penner (2005, p. 172-185); Penner and Rowe (2005, p. 216-230). A bit more detailed, Penner’s explanation is like this: In each 
motivated action, the agent starts from his desire for the final end (happiness) that takes the form of a desire to do whatever particular 
action is the best (a “whatever” desire) means available, considering his particular circumstances and his general priorities (health, 
pleasure, safety etc.). Finally, the agent reaches the belief about the best actual course of action and takes it to attain the maximum of 
happiness really available to him here and now (the practicable happiness). This explains the two famous Socratic psychological dicta: 
“Everyone desires the good” and “No one errs willingly”, which, observes Penner, mean the same thing. And the best-known Socratic 
dictum “Virtue is knowledge” means that wisdom is good qua the best way for one to achieve one’s final end. Penner’s “motivational 
intellectualism” is criticized by Brickhouse and Smith, who show that “Socrates thinks there are conative psychic powers other than the 
rational desires Penner recognizes” (2010, p. 51).
13 As Penner (2011, p. 269) puts it: “Like any other science or expertise, what the end is, is a purely factual matter. It is not a matter of 
moral truth, or norms, or values, and not a matter of what is intrinsically good, good as such, good in itself, good simpliciter, or any 
such thing. It is simply what is good for humans. For Socratic ethics, in total contrast to most of modern moral philosophy, there are no 
further elements of the subject-matter of ethics involving any of the aforementioned norms, values, moral principles, intrinsic goods, 
and the like. There is just the science of what is good for humans and of the means to that good.” But by reading Socratic ethics as a 
science for attaining egocentric goals, Penner does not commit Socrates with a “selfish egoism”, nor does he imply that the Socratic 
wise, by virtue of the ambivalence of science, does not mind to harm anybody else. Such a wise never finds motive to harm anyone. On 
the contrary, since the Socratic wise is more interested in improving the lives of their fellows, he or she leads them to engage in dialectic 
and self-examination in order to make them correct their own beliefs, so that they can take the best course of action to their happiness.
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In my view, Penner provides a perfectly plausible ac-
count of what being good means for Socrates, namely to be 
able to live a good life. However, to my mind, his unortho-
dox conclusion that Socratic ethics does not admit any “fur-
ther non-factual, non-natural, evaluative, normative, moral, 
or conventional elements” (2011, p. 291) is unconvincing. 
I think it is very unlikely that a thinker like Socrates, who 
wanted to ground philosophically values such as sophrosune
and dikaiosune – two cardinal virtues of ancient Greek eth-
ics – would stray so far beyond the influences of his own 
culture. But, more significantly, it seems to me that Penner 
exaggerates in reducing Socrates’ ethics as a whole to the ef-
fort of getting correct beliefs about which course of act ion 
will maximize happiness for an agent hic et nunc. Unless the 
philosopher had believed that poverty and death could be 
conducive to one’s present happiness, he would have done 
nothing else than pursuing his own happiness. As Ah-
bel-Rappe (2009, p. 88-89) elegantly noted, “Conceptions 
such as self-sacrifice, beneficence and duty” are “valid de-
scriptions” of Socrates’ act ions. According to Ahbel-Rappe, 
Socrates did not think that “the reasons for act ions can best 
be captured in terms of whether they are primarily self-ben-
eficial”; in Plato’s dialogues, he sometimes appears to act on 
a desire “to promote the well-being of others”, sometimes 
on a demand for justice and truth. In any case, our textual 
sources do not support Penner’s claim that Socratic ethics 
leaves no room for moral principles, norms, values, intrin-
sic goods, or conventional elements. Surely, Socrates was no 
traditionalist, nor did he seem to have held a natural and 
factual ethics while defending that what is pleasant is not 
necessarily good, or that committing an injustice is worse 
than suffering it, and that not being punished is still worse. 
He did not seem to be indifferent to notions of responsi-
bility, deserved punishment, and duty; this was a man who 
would rather be killed than abandon his ideal of justice and 
harm the polis. In brief, Penner’s theory of functional good 
ultimately does not fit well with some of Socrates’ convic-
tions and behaviors. Yet, although its upshot is contentious, 
the gist of Penner’s view of Socratic ethics is valid and tena-
ble, since Socrates actually understood virtue as the science 
of the ends and means to achieve happiness, the knowledge 
that he sp ent his lifetime searching for because he did not 
have it. This takes us to the next topic.
2. Socratic ignorance
Although Socrates conceived ethics as a science, he 
never said that he possessed it; rather, he often claimed to 
know nothing. Socrates’ profession of ignorance is not easy 
to interpret. The first difficulty is to ascertain whether it 
is sincere or ironic, since it appears in open conflict with a 
firm defense of certain convictions; and second, if it is sin-
cere, we are left with questions such as: what did Socrates 
ignore? And what kind of knowledge did he deny having? It 
is essentially around these questions that the long debate on 
Socratic ignorance has been developed14. I will not address 
this debate here; as my focus is not on epistemological issues 
but the ethical significance of Socrates’s disavowal of knowl-
edge, it shall suffice for my purposes to espouse the interpre-
tation by Brickhouse and Smith (1994, p. 30-44) as the most 
cogent answer to the paradox of Socrates’ “ignorance”. Both 
scholars take Socrates’ profession of ignorance as sincere, 
and then explain that the philosopher did not disavow all 
knowledge, but the knowledge of virtue or moral wisdom, 
which is the “craft of living”. That said, it might now be in-
teresting to evoke the famous story of the Delphic oracle in 
the Apology that gives us the clearest evidence of the ethical 
implication of ignorance in Socrates’ philosophy. 
Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge is particularly explored 
in the Apology as part of the defense strategy where Plato 
seeks to clear up the misunderstanding about the uniqueness 
of Socrates’ thought. To distance himself from other thinkers, 
who were seen with suspicion by Athenians, Socrates needed 
to elucidate his reputation of being wise. This reputation was 
due to a certain wisdom, the only one which he admits that he 
perhaps owns: this is the human wisdom (anthropíne sophía), 
which contrasts, on the one hand, with the “more than hu-
man wisdom” of the Sophists – alleged teachers of virtue of 
man and of the citizen – and, on the other hand, with the real 
wisdom of the gods. 
Socrates grasps the meaning of human wisdom after a 
long investigation of a divine message. One of the most rivet-
ing moments of the defense is the report of the events caused 
by the query of Chaerephon to the god of Delphi. Chaere-
phon asked the oracle if any man was wiser than Socrates. 
“The Pythian replied that no one was wiser” (21a. tr. Grube). 
The answer intrigues Socrates extremely:
When I heard of this reply I asked myself: 
“Whatever does the god mean? What is his 
riddle? I am very conscious that I am not 
wise at all15; what then does he mean by 
saying that I am the wisest? For surely he 
does not lie; it is not legitimate for him to 
do so” (21b. tr. Grube).
To test (elenchein) the oracle and check whether it was 
right, that is, decipher the riddle, Socrates set out to exam-
ine men who had a reputation for being wise, questioning 
those who seemed notable for possessing one of these types 
of knowledge: phronesis, poieisis and techne. While investi-
gating he found out that the higher the reputation, the less 
thoughtful people were, whereas the more “ordinary” per-
14 See Benson (2000, p. 168; 223, n. 1).
15 More literally: “I am conscious that I am wise, neither in something big nor in something small” (21b4-5).
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sons seemed to him “more fit in regard to being thoughtful 
(pros to phronimos echein, 22a6)”. Then, having examined 
politicians, poets, and craftsmen, Socrates realized the ig-
norance that lies at the core of the human condition and in 
which respect he was wiser: without knowing “the great-
est things” (tà mégista, 22d7-8), Socrates did not assume 
to know them. Eventually, this examination revealed, for 
him, what the god meant: “human wisdom is worth little 
or nothing”; in other words, when compared to the knowl-
edge of the god about what really matters, the knowledge 
possessed by man is very little. Socrates’ name had been 
used by the god merely to show that among mortals “is 
wisest who, like Socrates, understands that his wisdom is 
worthless” (23b. tr. Grube). In short, the human wisdom in 
question is a self-knowledge that involves the recognition 
of one’s own ignorance.
Nevertheless, acknowledging ignorance does not ex-
clude the possession of beliefs and convictions concerning 
certain general principles or specific truths. Even in the 
Apology Socrates defends many beliefs that for him were 
fundamental truths: he claims to know (oida) that it is evil 
and shameful to commit injustice and to disobey an au-
thority (29b); he is convinced of the absolute priority of 
watching out for prudence (phronesis), for the truth, and 
for keeping the soul in the best state possible (29d); he is 
sure that the greatest good for man (mégiston agathón an-
thropoi, 38a2) is to talk about virtue every day, to exam-
ine himself and others, and that an unexamined life is not 
worth living (ho anexetastos bios ou biotos, 38a5-6). Above 
all, he knows that he is not wise. As a second-order knowl-
edge, Socratic human wisdom refers to the knowledge of 
what one knows and does not know. This is the kind of 
knowledge that everyone is expected to have about his or 
her own condition. In its absence, people are prevented 
from pursuing knowledge of tà mégista, that is, the “mat-
ters involved in how people would live best their lives” (Pe-
terson, 2011, p. 32.)16, namely, moral knowledge, which is 
wisdom or virtue, the science of good and bad.
The Apology, therefore, displays the ethical sense of 
Socratic ignorance. Humans do not have precise or com-
plete knowledge about how to live well. The gods, on the 
contrary, are morally omniscient, they know all there is to 
know about morals and are thus wise and virtuous. One 
might ask: what kind of knowledge is this? It is the defi-
nitional knowledge of arete, that is to say, the knowledge 
of the nature of virtue that allows its possessor to not only 
provide an explanation of virtue but also to act flawlessly 
according to it. It is not about propositional knowledge, 
because its content is not merely the truth of a proposi-
tion; rather, it is direct knowledge of virtue itself and at the 
same time the expertise to achieve happiness. While a god 
utterly masters this knowledge, a human being can only 
have it unsteadily and to a certain degree17. Yet, as Socrates 
believed that the wiser a person, the happier she is, he took 
on the mission of enhancing people’s lives by helping them 
to become as wise as possible; and so, we come to our last 
topic in this paper.
3. Socrates as an educator
Deprived of the sought moral knowledge, wisdom or 
virtue – as indeed all humans are18 – but aware of it, Socra-
tes devoted himself to the challenging educational effort 
of trying to free people from the most damnable kind of 
ignorance: “Knowing not, but thinking that you know”19. 
The Socratic pedagogy was very different from that of the 
Sophists. The Sophists claimed to be teachers of virtue. 
Their paid instructions were intended to train brilliant 
speakers and competent citizens capable of a successful po-
litical career. Socrates, in turn, was concerned with a per-
son’s integrity and did not claim to have expertise (arete) 
on how to live well, the “real wisdom”, which is possessed 
by the gods. Nonetheless, if compared to any other Athe-
nian, we might say, Socrates was an advanced apprentice of 
the art of living; as the oracle said, he was the wiser of men, 
and so Alcibiades was correct in recognizing Socrates as a 
16 Also, Bett (2011, p. 220) thinks that “the greatest things” or “the things worth the most” (30a1-2) refer to ethical knowledge. He 
writes, “And the beginnings of an answer are also available in the Apology about what this really important knowledge might be. He 
says that he regularly criticizes those who rank trivial matters above those worth the most (pleistou axia, 30a1); and what he specifically 
accuses these people of neglecting is ensuring that their souls are in the best possible shape (29e1–3, 30b1–2). This, in turn, is what 
he [Socrates] himself attempts to persuade them to do. He also describes this task as that of trying to get them to care about being 
as good and wise (phronimôtatos) as possible (36c7), and as discussing virtue (aretê) with them and testing them about this and other 
things (38a3–5). Virtue and the state of one’s soul, then, are the most important matters for Socrates. So it is presumably some kind of 
knowledge or wisdom in this area, some kind of ethical knowledge or wisdom, that is the truly valuable variety he takes himself and 
everyone else to lack.”
17 I adopt Nicholas Smith’s view according to which “the kind of knowledge we should associate with Socrates’ virtue intellectualism is 
not a threshold concept, but rather one that is gradable. In other words, Socrates’ conception of knowledge, within what has come to 
be known as his ‘craft-analogy’, would be one that can be achieved and exemplified in degrees. The master craftsman has knowledge 
of that craft in some very high degree; the apprentice has knowledge of that craft in some lesser degree, and will continue to be only 
an apprentice (at best) so long as his or her knowledge does not reach the level required for master craftsmanship. The ignoramus, with 
respect to that same craft, will have extremely little or none of the relevant knowledge” (2016, p. 5).
18 Weiss (2006, p. 244): “Sophists, therefore, who think they can ‘educate human beings’ and make them noble and good are woefully 
mistaken”.
19 Sophist, 229c, tr. N. White; Apology, 29b.
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prudent and virtuous person20 – albeit he was this only to 
the extent of the humanly possible.
Rather than teaching, Socrates allowed people to listen 
to him while taking care of his own business – philosophy, 
examination, and refutation – and spoke with anyone for free. 
As he explains in the Apology:
Throughout my life, in any public activity I 
may have engaged in, I am the same man 
as I am in private life. I have never come to 
an agreement with anyone to act unjustly, 
neither with anyone else nor with any one 
of those who they slanderously say are my 
pupils. I have never been anyone’s teacher. 
If anyone, young or old, desires to listen 
to me when I am talking and dealing with 
my own concerns, I have never begrudged 
this to anyone, but I do not converse when 
I receive a fee and not when I do not. I am 
equally ready to question the rich and the 
poor if anyone is willing to answer my ques-
tions and listen to what I say. And I cannot 
justly be held responsible for the good or 
bad conduct of these people, as I never 
promised to teach them anything and have 
not done so (33a-b. tr. Grube).
Accordingly, he made of philosophy a way of life that 
consisted in the examination (exetazein) of himself and the 
others, through the refutation of all apparent knowledge 
and all purely imaginary arete. As pract iced in Plato’s ear-
ly dialogues, the Socratic elenchos did not have the function 
of bringing out truths or new knowledge to a soul that had 
not had them previously; strictly sp eaking, it could not even 
prove the interlocutors’ opinions to be true or false. The role 
assigned to the refutation is essentially negative, that is, to re-
veal the lack of knowledge of the interlocutors by showing 
the inconsistency of their beliefs21. However, we should stress 
that, given the intimate connection assumed by Socrates be-
tween beliefs and the life of an individual, the scope of the 
refutation was not limited to the statements made by the 
people being examined. In the elenctic encounters, the in-
terlocutor is always required to be honest and “say what you 
think”22, thus being prompted to give an account of his own 
life23. In this sense, the elenctic argument served as a powerful 
educational tool. It did not lend itself to inculcating finished 
doctrines, but was the most appropriate method for dealing 
with moral issues, which should be discussed thoroughly until 
a better position is achieved. Even if Socrates had had his own 
moral beliefs and gained a certain measure of virtue by means 
of the examination, he did his best to get the interlocutors to 
think for themselves, so that they also could discern on their 
own the beliefs and act ions conducive to a successful life. Fur-
thermore, it is by knowing oneself through self-examination 
that one would be better prepared to understand the signifi-
cance of – and perhaps to accept – the lessons that Socrates 
sp ent all his life disseminating. Those lessons are summarized 
by Socrates in the Apology by saying:
Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of 
the greatest city with the greatest reputa-
tion for both wisdom and power; are you 
not ashamed of your eagerness to possess 
as much wealth, reputation and honors as 
possible, while you do not care for nor give 
thought to wisdom [phronesis: prudence] 
or truth, or the best possible state of your 
soul? […] For I go around doing nothing but 
persuading both young and old among you 
not to care for your body or your wealth in 
preference to or as strongly as for the best 
possible state of your soul, as I say to you: 
Wealth does not bring about excellence, 
but excellence makes wealth and every-
20 The question whether the Socrates depicted in Plato’s early dialogues is compatible with that one in the middle dialogues is conten-
tious and has been replied variously. Indeed, there are diverse portraits of Socrates in the Platonic works. Some of them at first glance 
seem irreconcilable with each other, such as the ignorant inquirer in the Apology (and in the so-called “Socratic” dialogues) and the 
Socrates depicted by Alcibiades as a man full of wisdom and virtue in the Symposium. An influential line of interpretation claims that, 
closer to the historical Socrates the main character in the Platonic early writings is distinct and, in general, incompatible with the charac-
ter Socrates who is the mouthpiece of Plato in the middle dialogues (see Vlastos, 1991, 45-80). William Prior (2006), however, presents 
a different view about it. Focusing on the portrait of Socrates in Plato’s Symposium, he argues for the historical essence of Socrates’ 
representation in this middle dialogue and claims, accordingly, that this picture is reconcilable with that of the Socrates in the “Elenctic” 
dialogues. So Prior contends that the inconsistency between Socrates’ profession of ignorance and the picture of him as a wise man can 
be overcome by understanding the disavowal of knowledge as ironic – as Alcibiades himself did – that means, a sham to lure interlocu-
tors and submit them to the elenchos. Nevertheless, the irony involved in the Socratic argument is “complex and deep, a simultaneous 
concealment and expression of a constructive philosophical vision underlying the critical elenctic examination” (p. 161). In this sense, the 
Socratic irony, as Prior suggests, would indicate two faces of Socrates: his public face of an ignorant questioner, and his private face of 
the constructive philosopher revealed to disciples – or, as Prior prefers, “a mistagogos, a guide to the highest mysteries of philosophy.” 
On my part, I still believe that Socrates’ profession of ignorance was sincere when it comes to mastering wisdom or virtue; on the other 
hand, Socrates seemed and was wiser than others insofar as he made significant progress in the science of good. I am indebted to an 
anonymous referee of this journal for pointing out this issue, besides other useful comments.
21 We find a detailed description of elenchos by Plato himself at Sophist, 230b-d. The treatment given by Benson (2000, Part I) to the 
problem of the elenchos remains one of the most judicious. For a comprehensive survey – though restricted to the Anglophone tradition 
– of the scholarly literature on Socrates’ method, see Wolfsdorf (2013).
22 Gorgias, 495a, 500b; Republic, I, 345b, 346a, 350d-e.
23 Laches, 187e-188b.
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thing else good for men, both individually 
and collectively (29d-30a, tr. Grube).
Socrates dedicated himself to making his fellows care 
first and foremost for their souls and for immaterial goods, 
such as prudence, truth, honesty, and righteousness; in one 
word: virtue, since without knowledge one cannot live a good 
life. Although no human can be as wise and virtuous as the 
gods are, each person can and should be as thoughtful as pos-
sible. Certainly, Socrates was neither a teacher of virtue (at 
least not in Sophistic sense)24 nor an ignorant inquirer. He 
surely defended his firm moral convictions and held some de-
gree of virtue or wisdom, but his main lesson, as known from 
the Apology, was that “the greatest good for a man is to discuss 
virtue every day”, and that “the unexamined life is not worth 
living for men” (38a, tr. Grube). That is because he believed 
that to think about one’s own beliefs, feelings, and act ions 
leads to a humanly possible virtuous life. For someone to be 
good, Socrates urged, “know thyself ”. Only thus can humans 
seek the wisdom which gods have in the highest degree.
Conclusion
My main purpose in this paper was to provide an in-
terpretation of what Socrates understood by being good for a 
human being. I started from evidence in the Symposium that 
Socrates had his own moral beliefs and that he was a phron-
imos and sophron person. I argued that the Socratic moral 
doctrine was centered on the thesis of the identity of virtue 
and knowledge, which was articulated in this paper with So-
cratic ignorance and the educational role played by Socrates. 
To elucidate this tenet and core of Socratic ethics, I consid-
ered Penner’s account of Socrates’ ethical thought. Penner 
applied the theory of functions to explain what being a good 
or virtuous human is: good is one who knows or has the right 
beliefs about the best course of act ion available to his or her 
desired end, that is, happiness. Nevertheless, I cannot agree 
with Penner’s conclusion that Socratic ethics, by being natural 
and factual, allows no moral based on normative and evalua-
tive principles. Penner’s view, it seems to me, does not fit well 
with the startling moral convictions defended by Socrates. 
Then I addressed the point that, even though Socrates had 
had his own moral beliefs and convictions, the moral knowl-
edge, virtue, wisdom or the science of good and bad that only 
the gods completely master should not be ascribed to him. He 
repeatedly proclaimed his own ignorance. There is a knowl-
edge, however, that in the Apology Socrates admits to hav-
ing and that makes him wiser than others: human wisdom, 
that is, the recognition of his own ignorance and of human 
ignorance in general about the most important matter in life: 
how to do well. Endowed with this self-knowledge, Socrates 
assumed the educational task to try to free people of the worst 
ignorance: not to know and to think that you know. Through 
philosophy pract iced as examination by refutation (elenchos), 
Socrates attempted to improve his fellows. He did his best to 
lead people to self-knowledge, to take care of their souls, to 
dedicate themselves to phronesis, truth, and perfection of the 
soul, in sum, to be prudent and thoughtful; this is the way, in 
Socrates’s view, I contended, in which people would do well, 
be good and happy. 
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